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Abstract: This study examined the determinants of dividends in an environment where tax
was supposedly a main reason for paying dividends. The imputation tax system in Australia
had led to the expectation that firms should pay the maximum possible franked dividends.
Using panel data from January 1994 to December 2004, I found strong evidence that dividend
payout ratio and likelihood of paying dividends were positively related to ownership
concentration, profitability, firm size, the presence of dividend reinvestment scheme and tax
paid, and were negatively related to leverage, growth opportunity, business risks and investment.
My findings supported the conjecture that dividend policy could be explained by tax reasons,
residual theory and agency relationship simultaneously.
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This paper examines the determinants of dividend
payouts using Australian data. Australia provides
an interesting and unique testing ground in which
to study the relationship between ownership
concentration and dividend policy. The tax system
in Australia (known as the imputation system)
differs from that of the U.S. (known as the classical
tax system).  The Australian imputation tax system,
introduced in July 1987, removed the double
taxation of dividends, which leads to the argument
that many resident shareholders will prefer
companies to distribute imputation credits by
paying the maximum possible franked dividend
(Hamson & Ziegler, 1990).
Using panel data on a sample of Australian
publicly listed firms over the period 1994-2004,
results indicate that dividend payout ratio and
likelihood of paying dividends are positively
related to ownership concentration, profitability,
firm size, the presence of dividend reinvestment
scheme and tax paid, and are negatively related
to leverage, growth opportunity, business risks and
investment. The findings support the conjecture
that dividend policy can be explained by tax
reasons, residual theory and agency relationships,
simultaneously.
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DIVIDEND AND TAX MOTIVATION IN
AN IMPUTATION ENVIRONMENT
The Australian imputation tax system,
introduced on 1 July 1987, has an important effect
on the taxation of dividends paid to investors in
Australian companies. Its basic intention is to
eliminate the double taxation of dividends which
is inherent in the classical tax system still used in
many countries, including the U.S. The system
allows companies to pay dividends that carry
imputation credits for the income tax previously
paid by the company (known as franked
dividends). These imputation credits can be used
to reduce income tax paid by resident
shareholders. The dividends are either franked or
unfranked. Franked dividends are those paid from
earnings that have been taxed at the full Australian
corporate tax rate. Unfranked dividends are those
paid from earnings on which non-Australian
corporate tax has been paid or from tax exempt
earnings. Dividends franked between 0 and 100
per cent (i.e., partially franked dividends) are a
mixture of franked and unfranked dividends.
Given the benefits for resident shareholders,
dividend payouts of companies able to pay franked
dividends should have increased since the
introduction of the system. There is strong evidence
to support this argument. For example, Nicol (1992)
found that the median dividend payout ratio for
the 400 largest listed firms increased from 31 percent
in 1986 to 50 percent in 1990. Bellamy (1994)
found that companies paying franked dividends
have increased dividends relative to companies
paying unfranked dividends and relative to the
dividends they paid prior to imputation.
A theoretical model developed by Howard
& Brown (1992), assuming that all shareholders of
Australian companies are Australian resident tax
payers, suggests that the impact of imputation on
dividend policy depends on the company’s income
tax rate (t
c
), shareholders’ marginal income tax rate
(t
p
) and capital gains tax rate (t
g
). In particular, for
investors with t
p
 < t
c
 , the optimum dividend policy
is to pay a 100 percent franked dividend. In
contrast, for investors with t
p
 > t
c
, retention of profits
will be preferred unless t
g
 is large enough to offset
the difference between t
p
 and t
c
. However, under
the capital gains tax in Australia, t
g
 is generally
equal to t
p
. This leads firms to pay a 100 percent
franked dividend although t
p
 > t
c
. For a group of
investors whose shareholdings are capital gains tax
free because they were acquired before 20
September 1985, when t
p
 > t
c
 , retention of profits
will be preferred. As such, Howard and Brown
suggest that the optimal dividend policy for most
Australian-owned companies is to pay the
maximum franked dividends.
Evidence on the impact of the imputation
tax system on dividend policy and the use of
dividend reinvestment plans (DRPs) in Australia has
been provided by Bellamy (1994). Specifically, she
finds that (1) firms pay a constant level of
imputation credits to satisfy demands of their
clientele; (2) firms paying dividends increase their
payout ratios to ensure that credits are passed on
to shareholders; and (3) firms are more likely to
use DRPs after the introduction of dividend
imputation. A DRP scheme allows firms to pay out
a greater proportion of their earnings as dividends
while simultaneously maintaining their investment
policy as a portion of these funds will be returned
via the issue of new shares to participants.
In addition, Ho (2003) examines panel data
from the constituent stocks of the ASX 200 Index
of the Australian stock market and the Nikkei 225
Index of the Japanese stock market. The evidence
that Australia, with an imputation tax system which
favors dividends over capital gains, has a
significantly higher dividend payout than Japan
lends support to the influence of environment on
dividend policy. Dividend policies in Australia and
Japan are affected by different financial factors.
The author’s fixed effects regression models
indicate that dividend policies are affected
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positively by size in Australia and liquidity in Japan,
and negatively by risk in Japan only. An industry
effect is found to be significant in both countries.
AGENCY THEORY OF DIVIDENDS
The finance literature suggests that
dividends may help reduce agency problems. The
seminal studies of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook
(1984) provide agency cost explanations of why
firms pay dividends. In particular, Rozeff suggests
that dividend payments are part of the firm’s
optimal monitoring mechanism and these
payments help to reduce agency costs. In his model,
firms choose a dividend payout ratio that minimises
their total costs (i.e., agency costs and transaction
costs of financing). Agency costs decrease with
dividends, while transaction costs increase with
dividends. The minimisation of total costs results
in a unique optimal dividend payout for a given
firm. Meanwhile, Easterbrook argues that dividend
payments force managers to raise funds in the
capital markets more frequently than they would
without dividend payments. Therefore dividends
cause managers to be frequently scrutinised by
external professionals such as investment bankers,
lawyers and public accountants. This in turn forces
managers to act in line with shareholders’ interests,
thereby reducing agency costs of equity.
There has been a substantial number of
empirical studies that lend support for the agency
costs explanation of dividends.  Rozeff (1982) finds
that firms with higher firm-specific risks and high
growth firms pay smaller dividends, which is
consistent with his model. Rozeff’s model also
receives support from Dempsey & Laber (1992) who
replicated Rozeff’s analysis using samples from
different periods of time and from Crutchley &
Hansen (1989) who find that dividends are
negatively related to the firm’s flotation costs.
Meanwhile, Jensen et al. (1992) and Noronha et
al. (1996) find that insider ownership, dividends
and debt financing are substitute mechanisms in
controlling agency costs which is consistent with
Easterbrook’s (1984) argument.
Residual Theory of Dividends
The residual theory of dividends is a school
of thought that suggests that dividend paid by a
firm should be viewed as residual or the amount
left over after all acceptable investment
opportunities have been undertaken. According
to this approach, as long as the firm’s equity need
exceeds the amount of retained earnings, no cash
dividends is paid.
METHOD
The research design includes annual panel
data over an eleven-year period from January 1994
to December 2004. The sampling frame consists of
a population of all companies listed on the
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 1994. Of these
companies, financial firms were excluded as their
dividend decisions are influenced by government
regulations. In contrast, I include any firms delisted
during this period to avoid survivorship bias,
providing that they had data available one year
before delisting. The final sample of 829
companies included 696 active companies and 133
delisted companies. After excluding observations
with incomplete ownership or accounting data,
the final sample has 6,665 firm-year observations.
Of this sample, 2,382 (36.5%) observations
have dividend payouts higher than zero (i.e. pay
dividends) and 4,283 (63.5%) observations have
zero dividend payouts (i.e. do not pay dividends).
Of dividend paying observations, 1,830 (77%) are
for fully and partially franked dividend payers and
552 (23%) observations are for unfranked dividend
payers. In terms of industry, 4,016 (60.2%)
observations are industrial firms and 2,649 (39.8%)
observations are mining firms.
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Accounting data are collected from 
Datastream and FinAnalysis databases, respectively. 
Ownership data are collected manually from 
companies’ annual reports obtained on-line from 
DatAnalysis and Connect-4 databases. In their 
annual reports, Australian listed companies have 
to disclose the end-of-financial-year shareholdings 
of substantial (block) shareholders and the largest 
twenty registered shareholders. 
Model and Measurement of Variables
I utilised a panel study methodology as 
it provides more robust information, more 
variability, less collinearity among variables, more 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency (Baltagi, 
1995). The methodology also permits us to control 
for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Specifically, I 
use pooled and random effects tobit regressions 
as around 67 percent of observations in my sample 
have dividend payout ratios of zero. In a pooled 
tobit regression, non-spherical disturbances 
(i.e., serial correlation and heteroskedasticity) 
are controlled using the Huber-White/Sandwich 
estimator (clustered) for variance. The random 
effects panel data tobit regression treats firm 
specific unobserved characteristics as a random 
variable and, therefore, they were a part of the 
error term. As a robustness check, I also use pooled 
and random effects logit regressions.
The tobit regression used to test the impact 
of ownership concentration on dividend payouts 
takes the following form:
Dividend Payout Ratioit = 0 + i Ownership
 concentrationit + 1 Profitabilityit + 2 Leverageit+
 3  Firm sizeit +  4 Growth-opportunityit +  
 5 Business riskit +  6 Investmentit + 7 Tax paidit+ 
8 DRPit + 9 (Industryit) + 10-17 (Year ) +  it                                  (1)  
The  subscripts i and t represent firm and 
year, respectively. Dividend payout ratio is defined 
as dividend scaled by net earnings. 
 Ownership concentration is measured by the 
aggregate ownership of shareholders holding at least 
five percent of equity (i.e., substantial shareholders). 
Agency theory (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984) 
predicts that ownership concentration is negatively 
related to dividend payouts. Higher ownership 
concentration will reduce agency conflicts due to 
better managerial monitoring by large shareholders. 
In turn, it will reduce the needs to pay higher 
dividends or the monitoring role of dividends. In 
Australia, however, firms have an incentive to pay 
higher dividends in order to distribute franking 
credits. It can be argued that while managers prefer 
to preserve cash flows by paying lower dividends, 
large shareholders may force them to pay higher 
dividends. Thereby, ownership concentration can 
be positively related to dividend payouts.
Profitability is defined as net profit after tax 
before abnormal earnings divided by total assets. A 
positive effect of profitability on dividend payouts is 
expected as dividends are paid from earnings. 
Leverage is defined as the book value of 
total debt divided by total assets. Jensen et al. 
(1992) indicate that dividends and debt financing 
are substitute mechanisms to reduce equity agency 
costs. Debt holders have an aversion to dividends 
since their payment transfers a firm’s asset to 
shareholders. Thus, a negative relationship between 
debt and dividend payouts is expected. 
Firm size is measured by a natural logarithm 
of total assets. Larger firms tend to have better 
access to the capital markets, which reduces their 
dependence on internally generated funding and 
allows for higher dividend-payout ratios (Aivazian 
& Cleary, 2003). Therefore, I expect a positive 
relationship between dividend payouts and firm 
size. 
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Growth opportunity is defined as market to
book value ratio. A negative relationship between
dividend and growth opportunity is expected as
high growth firms may pay lower dividends due
to their larger investment requirements and a
tendency to retain funds to avoid external
financing with its attendant costs (Rozeff, 1982;
Fama & French, 2001).
Business risk is measured by the standard
deviation of EBIT in the previous 5 years. Greater
business risk makes the expected direct relationship
between current and expected future profitability
less certain (Jensen et al., 1992). Thus, a negative
relationship between dividend payouts and
business risk is expected.
Investment is defined as capital expenditure
divided by total assets. Miller & Modigliani (1961)
argue that a firm’s investment decisions are not
affected by its dividend decisions. The residual
dividend theory suggests that a firm will pay
dividends only when its internally generated funds
are not completely utilized for investment
purposes (Alli et al., 1993), whereas the pecking
order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) suggests that
internally generated funds are the least expensive
forms of finance. Accordingly, investment is
expected to be negatively associated with
dividend.
DRP is a dummy variable with one for firms
with dividend reinvestment plans and zero
otherwise. Australian firms can use DRPs to fulfil
the necessity of paying larger dividends while at
the same time maintaining their investment policy
(Bellamy, 1994). A DRP scheme allows firms to pay
out a greater proportion of their earnings in
dividends, as a portion of these funds will be
returned to the firm via the issue of new shares to
participants. It is expected that firms with DRPs will
pay higher dividends or will demonstrate a greater
likelihood of paying dividends.
Tax paid is defined as tax paid divided by
total assets. The imputation system requires a
franking account to be maintained by each
company. Credits to a company’s franking account
arise from two sources: payment of company
Australian income tax and receipt of Australian
franked dividends from other companies. For each
dollar of company income tax paid, the credit to
the franking account is: $((1-t
c
)/t
c
), where t
c
 is the
Australian company tax rate. The balance in a
company’s franking account at any time shows the
maximum amount that it can pay as a franked
dividend (see Peirson et al., 2006). Under the
Australian imputation tax system, firms may seek
to raise their dividend payouts because of the
increased incentive to distribute taxed profits
(Hamson & Ziegler, 1990). Hence, a positive
relationship between tax paid and dividend is
expected.
 To account for variation in dividend payouts
due to industry differences, I incorporated an
industry dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the firm is in the mining sector and zero
otherwise (i.e. industrial). Year dummy variables
are also included in the model to remove secular
effects among the independent variable. Ten
dummy variables are used to cover the eleven year
data.
Table 1 summarise the potential relationship
between firm’s characteristics and dividends
according to tax motive, agency theory and
residual theory.
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For estimation using pooled and random 
effect logit regression, I use the following 
model:
Paying dividend dummyit = 0 +  i Ownership 
concentrationit +  1 Profitabilityit + 2 Leverageit+ 
3 Firm sizeit + 4 Growth-opportunityit + 
 5 Business riskit + 6 Investmentit+ 7 Tax paidit + 
8 DRPit + 9 (Industryit) +10-17 (Year) + it                          (2) 
The subscripts i and t represent firm and 
year, respectively. Paying dividend dummy is a 
categorical variable with one if firm paid dividend 
at certain year and zero otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive information for 
the entire sample. 
Table 1. Summary of Relationships between the Firms’ Characteristics and Dividends
Variable References Agency
theory 
Residual 
theory 
Tax motivation 
Ownership
concentation 
Rozeff (1982) 
Easterbrook (1984) 
Bellamy (1994) 
- +
Profitability Jensen et al. (1992) 
Cructhley et al. (1999) 
+
Leverage Jensen et al. (1992) 
Cructhley et al. (1999) 
-
Firm size Aivazian and Cleary (2003)
Booth & Smith (1986) 
+
Growth
opportunity 
Barclay et al. (1995) 
Fama & French (2001) 
-
Business risk Jensen et al. (1992) 
Booth & Smith (1986) 
-
Investment Alli et al. (1993) -
DRP Bellamy (1994) +
Tax paid Hamson & Ziegler (1990)        +
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents the dynamic of dividend 
payout ratio of Australian firm during the period 
of 1994 – 2004.
Table 3. Dividend Policy in Australia: 1994-2004
* This indicates proportion of firms, rather than the mean 
proportion for associated variables.
It can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, on average, 
Australian firms distributed 21.67 percent of their 
earnings as dividends. Interestingly, dividend 
payouts of Australian firms increase in 1997 and 
1998, but tend to decrease after that period. 
Interestingly, the proportion of firm paying 
dividends also decreases over time in Australia.
Empirical Results
Table 4 presents pooled and random effect 
tobit regression estimates of the determinants 
of dividend payouts based on Equation 1 using 
dividend payout ratio as dependent variable. 
Variable Definition Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Dividend payout 
ratio
Dividends / net profit after tax before 
abnormal earnings 
0.2167 0.3423 0 1.99
Ownership -
concentration
The aggregate ownership of 
shareholders holding at least five 
percent of equity  
0.4064 0.2439 0 1
Profitability Net profit after tax  before abnormal 
earnings / total assets 
-0.1862 0.9010 -35.58 6.70
Leverage  Book value total debt / total assets 0.1791 0.3073 0 9.66
Firm size Ln (total assets) 17.3737 2.1851 10.09 25.17
Growth opportunity Market to book value ratio 1.6290 2.6182 0.06 71.88
Business risk Standard deviation of EBIT in the 
previous 5 years 
9.0x106 30.1x10
6
1,605 8.0 x108
Investment Capital expenditure / total assets 0.1028 0.1973 0 6.78
Tax paid Tax paid / total assets 0.0136 0.0285 0 0.90
DRP Dummy variable. 1 for firms with div. 
reinvestment plans, 0 otherwise 
0.1130 0.3165 0 1
Year Sample size Dividend payout ratio (%) Paying dividend firms (%)*
1994 335 22.64 43.28
1995 560 22.03 40.36
1996 616 22.38 39.61
1997 656 24.66 40.10
1998 683 25.76 40.70
1999 686 22.95 38.34
2000 664 21.03 34.94
2001 655 18.84 32.21
2002 657 19.07 30.29
2003 641 19.23 31.67
2004 512 19.48 32.42
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Table 4. Determinants of Dividends: Tobit
Regression
*** significant at the 0.01 level
**   significant at the 0.05 level
*     significant at the 0.10 level
Table 4 shows that coefficient on ownership
concentration is positive and significant at the
conventional level, regardless of the estimation
technique and ownership concentration proxy. The
dividend policy of Australian firms is also influenced
by other factors. Specifically, firms which have
higher franking credits (as measured by tax paid)
or adopt dividend reinvestment plan tend to pay
higher dividends.
Moreover, dividends are negatively related
to leverage, growth opportunity, business risk and
investment. Dividends are also positively
influenced by profitability and firm size. Coefficient
on industry is negative, implying that mining firms
pay lower dividends than industrial firms.
A positive relationship between dividend
payout ratio and ownership concentration suggests
that firms with the higher ownership of substantial
shareholders have higher dividend payout ratios
than other firms. The results, therefore, support the
conjecture that in Australia large, or more
concentrated, shareholders have an incentive, and
the power, to influence dividend decisions. That
is, large shareholders may force management to
pay higher dividends in order to distribute higher
franking credits that benefit them.
A positive relationship between dividend
payouts and tax paid and DRP is consistent with
the notion that Australian firms prefer to pay
higher dividends to distribute franked dividends
as soon as possible to shareholders (Pattenden and
Twite, 2008). Moreover, a negative relationship
between dividend payouts and leverage, growth
opportunity, business risk and investment is
consistent with the agency theory of dividends. A
positive relationship between dividend payouts
and profitability stems from the fact that dividends
are distributed from profits (Statescu, 2006). A
positive relationship between dividend payouts
and firm size supports the notion that larger firms
tend to have better access to the capital markets,
which reduces their dependence on internally
generated funding (Al-Yahyaee et al., 2008). As
such, the overall results generally support the tax
motivation, residual theory and the agency theory
of dividends. I repeat the analysis using dividends
scaled by assets and dividend yield as a proxy for
dividend payout ratio. The results are generally
consistent with results presented in Table 4.
Table 5 presents pooled and random effect
logit regression estimates for Equation 2 using
paying dividend dummy as dependent variable.
Variable Pooled Random Effects 
Ownership concentration 0.238*** 
(6.39) 
0.226*** 
(4.84) 
Profitability 
 
0.712*** 
(20.51) 
0.549*** 
(14.34) 
Leverage 
 
-0.241*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.378*** 
(-6.24) 
Firm size 
 
0.184*** 
(30.91) 
0.229*** 
(27.30) 
Growth opp. -0.038*** 
(-5.35) 
-0.009 
(-1.44) 
Business risks -0.000*** 
(-8.86) 
-0.000** 
(-2.28) 
Investment 
 
-0.241*** 
(-2.48) 
0.089 
(0.98) 
Tax  6.449*** 
(22.93) 
3.54*** 
(11.57) 
DRP 
 
0.253*** 
(11.16) 
0.164*** 
(7.03) 
Industry dummy -0.467*** 
(-20.10) 
-0.572*** 
(-15.95) 
Year dummy 
 
Included Included 
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Table 5. Determinants of Dividends: Logit
Regression
*** significant at the 0.01 level
**   significant at the 0.05 level
*     significant at the 0.10 level
The result shows that the likelihood of firm
paying dividends is positively related to
profitability, firm size, DRP and tax paid, and
negatively related to leverage, growth oppor-
tunity, business risk and investment. The results are
consistent with those presented in Table 4.
ADDITIONAL CHECK FOR ROBUSTNESS
I have conducted several additional
sensitivity analyses which suggest that the results
reported earlier in this paper are insensitive to
various alternative specifications. I explore
alternative proxies for the explanatory variables.
For example, effective tax rate (tax paid divided
by pre-tax income) is used instead of tax paid scaled
by assets, total market capitalization is used as a
measure of firm size, and EBIT scaled by total assets
is used as a proxy for profitability. I also run the
tobit regression using an alternative ownership
concentration measure such as the largest
shareholdings (TOP1) and the five largest
shareholdings (TOP5) which is collected from the
Top 20 list in firms’ annual reports. The results are
generally consistent with my earlier analyses.
I use six-digit GICS Industry Classifications to
control for industry differences instead of a dummy
variable for mining versus industrial sector.
Although the number of observations in some six-
digit GICS Industry Classifications is relatively small,
the results are similar to those reported in Table 3.
I also test for robustness in the presence of outliers
and influential observations by truncating the
largest one to five percent probability levels for
each tail of the distribution for the model variables.
The results again are consistent. Finally, I repeat
my analysis for a subset of firms that have non-
negative net earnings to remove the possibility
that firms with positive retained earnings, but
negative net earnings, are unable to pay dividends
due to cash shortages. I generally find similar
results.
CONCLUSION
This study investigated the determinants of
dividend policy for a sample of Australian listed
firms over the period January 1994 to December
2004. The Australian imputation tax system,
introduced in July 1987, removed the double
taxation of dividends, which leads to the argument
that firms should distribute imputation credits by
paying the maximum possible franked dividend.
The overall findings support the conjecture that
dividend policy of Australian firms is driven by tax
reasons (i.e., to distribute franking credits). But
both tobit and logit regression results also suggest
that dividend policy of Australian firms is also
influenced by profitability, leverage, firm size,
growth opportunity, business risk and investment.
Variable Pooled Random Effects 
Ownership concentration 0.756*** 
(4.20) 
0.644 
(1.37) 
Profitability 
 
4.325*** 
(4.85) 
4.022*** 
(12.15) 
Leverage 
 
-1.343*** 
(-4.06) 
-3.129*** 
(-6.59) 
Firm size 
 
0.849*** 
(22.71) 
1.798*** 
(17.75) 
Growth opp. -0.228*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.080 
(-1.13) 
Business risks -0.000*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.000*** 
(-2.86) 
Investment 
 
-0.863* 
(-1.86) 
0.153 
(0.21) 
Tax  29.798*** 
(10.31) 
27.344*** 
(11.47) 
DRP 
 
1.714*** 
(10.78) 
1.402*** 
(5.40) 
Industry dummy -1.921*** 
(-17.18) 
-4.047*** 
(-11.40) 
Year dummy 
 
Included Included 
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